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ABSTRACT 
Mobile Money Transfer has, in just a littl e over ten years, transformed the lives of millions of 
Kenyans in addition to greatly improving the economy of the countty. Mobile money 
penetration in Kenya currently stands at 68% of the adult economy. This has not only made 
Kenyans the most banked people in Africa but has also greatly contributed to improving the 
lifestyles of many Kenyans who don't live within urban areas. 
The success of mobile money in Kenya is greatly backed by the rise in mobile phone 
penetration and advancement in technology. This success is however greatly threatened 
owing to the fact that the telecommunication companies operating mobile money services do 
so in an enviroruncnt where there is no clear law or regulation on data protection. 
A mobile money environment is synonymous with generatioP of big data. Big data here 
includes large aTtd complex sets of data that arc usually collected by the telecommunication 
companies offering mobile money services. This data includes, bl!t is · not limited to! 
infmmation relat:ng to an identified or identifiable natur~l person by which this person can be 
identitied, directly or indirectly in particular by reference to an identification number ot to 
one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, mental, economic, cultural or 
social identity. If left unprotected, such infonnation is vulnerable to potential abuses and 
misuse. 
A data protection framework is thus not only vital to guarantee right to infom1ation privacy 
of individuals but also to necessary to ensure the continued success of mobil'e money as such 
. . 
a framework would giw individuflls incre:ased confidence in using mubile money scrvic~s . 
This paper thus outlines the need to have in place a clear data protection regulatory 
framework in Kenya that clearly outlines the processes of data collection, retrieval, 
processing, storage, usc and disclosure of personal data associated with mobile money 
transfers. The paper does this by discussing the need for privacy protection with regards to 
mobile money transfers, critically examining the Data Protection Bill 2013, and lastly looking 
at best practice from Ghana. 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
l.lBACKGROUND 
Right to privacy is one of the most fundamental tights a human being should be able to enjoy 
as it is intrinsic to the right to li fe. 1 In its earliest formulations, the right to privacy i·s seen in 
the 1789 Ametican Bill of Rights proposed by James Madison. The Ninth Amendment 
describes the ri ght as; "an unspecified right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. "1 
ln as much as the original purpose of this amendment was to limit the powers of the Federal 
government, not to expand them, the overarching conception of privacy is strikingly 
manifest. The same right is then later seen in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR) which gua rantees that no one shall be subjected to arbitraty interference with his 
priv~cy. famil~', home or ccrrespr.nc\~nce, or to anacks upon hi s honour ar.d rcputatton. Tt 
lu.thcr states that everyone has the right to the protection nf lh~ Jaw agaii:St such interference 
or anacks.3 
The Constitution of Kenya (2010) also provides for the right to privacy.4 ln addition to 
gu(lrantcc.ing the right to privacy, ihc Kenyan Constitution further provides for the right to 
infonnaticn privacy under article 3 I (c) and (d). This at ticle states that; 
"Eve1y person has the right to privacy which includes not to have; information relaiing to 
theirjcunily or private affairs unneces<;ari(y required or revealed; or !he privacy of their 
cummun icutir;;;s_ nifril•p,ed. " 
This then begs the question what constitutes as the right to privacy or specifically inf01mation 
privacy and eventually what aspects about your information privacy should be protected by a 
law on data protection. 
Tnf01mation privacy can be defined as, legal safeguards that have been put in place in 
information storing systems to prevent the collection, retrieval, processing, storage, use and 
Right to Privacy is a fundamental right, it is intrinsic to the right to life: Supreme Court, 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/right-to-privacy-is-a-fundamental-right-supreme-
court/articleshow/60203394.cms on 9 December 2017. 
2 1791: US Bill of Rights (I st I 0 Amendments) - with commentary hllp://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/179 1-us-bill-
of-rights-1 st-1 0-amendments-with-commentary on 9 December 2017. 
1 UNGA, Universal Declaration of Human Rights. UN GA res 217 A ( Ill). UN Doc A/81 0 at 71 I 0 December 
1948. 
~ Article 31 (c) and (d), Constitution of Kenya (201 0). 
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disclosure of personal information by unauthoris<;d parties. 5 On the other hand, personal 
information/data means any inf01mation relating to an identified or identifiable natural pen~on 
by which this person can be identified, directly or indirectly in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his/her physical, physiological, 
mentai, economic, cultural or social identity. 6 Such infonnation may indudc, but is not 
limited to, fmancial records, data shared over the intemet, or even medica l health records. 
In this study, Data Controller means, any natural or legal person, public or private, any other 
organization or association which alone or jointly with others, decides to collect and process 
personal data and detennines the purposes.7 Whereas, Data Subject means, any natural person 
that is the subject of personal data processing. 8 
In this study, infonnat:on privacy wi ll narrow down to focus majorly on personal infonns.tion 
that is stored over mobile money transfer databases . Such information is usually slored by the 
- - . 
agents that facilitate mobile money transfers or by tl1e databases of the relevant 
telecommunications companies involved or both. The Jata shared will usually include 
information 1hat is of a personal nature, that is, infonnation that is specific to a certain 
identifiable individual.9 Most of the time, such infom1ation encompasses: age, gender, 
personal identifi~..:ation numbers (PINs), cunent location, debit and credit transactions and at 
times even personal communications between other mobile money tr:msfers users. 10 
Mobile money transfer, on the other hand, can be defined as a ·i11ovement of value that is 
made froin a mobile wallet, accrues to a mobile wc:llet, and/or is initiated using a mobile 
phone.' : A mobile wallet is an account that is primarily accessed using a mobile phone.-1-2 A 
Stanford Encyclopaedia of Phi losophy: Privacy and Information Technology, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/ on 8 February 20 I 8. 
6 Article I, African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection. 
7 Article I. African Union Convemion on Cyber Securi~v and Personal Data Protection. 
8 Article I, African Union Convention on Cyber Securiry and Personal Data Prot eel ion. 
9 Scharwatt C, Katakam A, Jennifer r:, MuqJhy A, and Naghovi N, 'Global System for Mobile Phone 
Communication Association: Mobile Money for the Unbanked, Mobi le Money Definitions, GSMA, 2010.4. 
10 Scharwatl C, Katakam A, Jennifer F, Murphy A, and Naghavi N, 'Global System for Mobile Phone 
Communication Association: Mobile Money for the Unbanked, Mobile Money Definitions. 4. 
11 Scharwalt C, Katakam A, Jennifer F, Murphy A, and Naghavi N, 'Global System for Mobile Phone 
Communication Association: Mobile Money for the Unbankcd, Mobile Money Definitions, 4. 
12 Scharwatt C, Katakam A. Jennifer F. Murphy A, and Naghavi N, 'Global System for Mobile Phone 
Communication Association: Mobile Money forth~ Unbanked, Mobile Money Definitions, 4. 
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mobile mon~y transfer can also occur in the form of a mobile payml:!nt which is a transfer i.u 
pay for goods or services, either at the point of sale (retail) or remotely (bill payments). 13 
1.2 STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
As it is cuiTently world over, technology brings with it the risk of the violation of the tight to 
information. In the Kenyan case of Benard Murage v Fineserve Africa Limited and others, 14 
we see an instance where the right to information privacy was tlu·eatened. The petitioner was 
requesting the High Court at Nairobi to restrain the first and second respondents (Fineserve 
Africa Limited and Equity Bank respectively) from rolling out the thin SIM (Subsctiber 
Identification Module) teclmology pending the enactment of the Data Protection Bill. The 
SIM was to be used by customers uf the second respondent to interact with their banks 
,j!rcct:y f:·vm their phones. 'll1c petitioi·Jer claimed that the technology pvst;;d a risk to 
information privacy as the thin SIM technology. as proposed to be u~ed by the respondent, is 
able to monitor communications taking place between the primary SIM and the mobile 
handset thus exposing it to man-in-the-middle attacks including personal data contamination 
and access by third parties. 
It was also the Petitioner's case that tbc thin SIM technology. as mani~· ·sted from its 
functionality, provides a real threat to the Petitioner's enjoyment of his rights under Atticle 
31 (c) and (d) of th~.! Constitution in so f:u· as hi~ personal data is concerned. His fears were 
g.r•.El!1Clcd o;; rh~ st:cw·ity vu!ner0b~~itiC" "f th~.! thin SlM •vhich t·:1.nsccnd~ Uie So;opt of !hr 
user by maktug it jJossible for third pm1ies to ac·;~s~ persona'! and sensitive data such as PINs 
(Personal Identification Number) and encryption keys. 
FUI1her, it was also the Petitioner's case that in countries where the thin SlM has been used, 
Data Protection laws have been enacted unlike in Kenya where there is no law on Data 
Protection. 
The petition was however dismissed as the Petitioner had not satisfactorily proved breach of 
the right to privacy as guaranteed by the constitution or a threat to breach the right. In coming 
to his conclusion, the learned judge stated that the Communications Authority of Kenya 
13 Scharwatt C, Katakam A. Jennifer F. Murphy A. and Naghavi N. 'Global System lor Mobile Phone 
Communication Association: Mobile Money for the Unbankcd, Mobile Money Definitions, 4. 
14 l2014] eKLR. High Court of Kenya at Nairobi. 
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(CAK), as the communications regulator in the country, -is bct:.cr placed·io assess on whether 
the thin SIM technology, as was intended to be used by the second respondent, wouid bring 
with it a threat of violation to the right to information privacy. With regards to the enactment 
of the Data Protection Bill, the learned judge stated that a court cannot order parliament to 
create iaw as it is a separate and distinct arm of govenunent thus he chose to uphold the 
separation of powers doctrine. 
Notwithstand ing the failure to prove the Right to Privacy breach, the case clearly shows the 
imminent threat posed on privacy by technological advancements especially in the field of 
Mobile Mo ney/Mobile Banking as companies continue to compete. 
This however, is not an isolated case. Recent! y, the Financial Action Task Force (FA TF), 
which is an orgr.11ization that sets out internationally accepted- standards and -promote 
effective irnplementation of regulatory me~st~res for combating mo!ley laundering and 
tetTorism financing, rcc0mmL"11ded user transparency and collection of transaction data in 
mobile money transfers. 15 Kenya is a member country to Eastern and Southem Africa Anti-
~1oney Laundering Group (ESAAMLG). This is the regional body tasked with combating 
money laundering hy implementing the FATF Recommendations. The F AFT is the only 
global body that works to generate the necessary political will to bring about national 
legislative and regulatory ref01 ms in the areas of money laundering, terrorist financing and 
other related tlu·eats to the integrity of the international financial system. 16 The FATF has 
d~::vc loped a series of Recommenclations that are recognised as the international standard for 
of mass destruction. They fom1 the basis for a co-ordinated response to these threats to the 
integtity of the financial system and help ensure a level playing field. First issued in 1990, 
the FA TF Recommendations have been revised in 1996, 200 I, and 2003 . In 20 1.2, these 
recommendations were again revised to ensure that they remain up to date and relevant, and 
they are intended to be of universal application. These recommendations have been integrated 
into national laws of its over 30 member states as well as member states of it regional 
affiliates such as ESAAMLG which in total include over 70 countries. 17 The Kenya Finance 
Act, 20 16 is one such legis lation that mirrors some of the recommendations of the FATF. 
15 Financial Action Task Force (f ATF), international Standards on Combating Money Laundering and tfte 
Financing o.fTerrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommend(// iOns 11 and 12, 2012, 14-15. 
16 FATF. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/aboutl on 8 February 20 17. 
17 FATF. http://www.fatf-gafi.org/aboutl on 8 February 20 17. 
4 
These recommendations by the FA TF arr: :;ot very new to Kenya as telecommunications were 
::~!ready collecting transaction data through their agents. The only novel addition brought 
about by the recommendations is the requirement that collected data is maintained for five 
years and that due diligence is carried out by the relevant parties to a mobile money transfer. 
Such due diligence should include confirming the identity of clients and scrutinising client 
transactions. 
These requirements, when fully implemented in the Kenyan mobile money sector, will pose a 
great threat to privacy especially considering that Kenya still doesn't have a comprehensive 
law on data protection. This threat to privacy is even more imminent considering the recent 
UN rep011 that noted a lack of legis lation amongst the East African Community (EAC), that 
is Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda Tanzania and Uganda, "that clearly defines who can get access to 
I. 
a mobile money trail, and how, when or under what conditions such access may be 
obtained."' 18 
1.3 JUSTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM 
This study is imp01tant because as seen above, with tiJrther advancement in technolog)', so 
do...:<> the risk of infom1ation privacy breaches and violations grow iu:minenl. Technology in 
the 2 I ~~ century is a force to reckon with and if not used properly it can lead to many human 
rights violations among them the violation ol the right to infom1ation privacy. The situation is 
even more unique to Kenya where mobiie money transfers account<: for 3 Billion Kenya 
Shillings a day. 19 This makes Kenya not only the regional froQtic:- in mobile money transfers 
but aiso a global puwerhouse in the mobile mor~·ey s~ctor. With s~ch a h'uge iJroiiferati6t1.·of 
Mobile Money in the country so does the data held by telecommunication companies and/or 
other third-party data controllers continue to increase.20 This puts these data controllers in a 
very precarious position, more so, with the absence of a Jaw on data protection in place. As 
such there is need to have a data protection framework due to the huge potential for abuse of 
data held by controllers and/or other agents. This situation also further puts the customers 
18 UN Conference on Trade and Development, · Mobile Money for Business Development in the East African 
Community: A Comparative Study on Existing Platforms and Regulations.· UN Publication 
UNCTADID1V STICTI201212. 2012, 20. 
19 Mobile Money Transactions Hit 3 Billion Kenya Shillings a Day, 
https:/ / www .standardmedia.co.ke/business/article/2000 197 514/mobi le-money-transactions-i n-kenya-hit-sh3-
billion-a-day on 8 February 2017. 
10 Do Mobi le Money Clients Need More Protection? hllp://www.cgap.org/blog/do-mobile-money-cliems-need-
more-protection on 9 December 2017. 
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(data subjects) in a di::.advantage. as there are currently no legal remedies with regard:; to 1 
info1mation privacy rights vio lations. 
In addition, large amounts of personal data generated from Mobile Money transactions are 
kept across servers, networks and filing systems (electronically and manually), locally and 
abroad.21 These can then be shared by different kgal and natural persons, across borders 
and in a manner that a data subject could not have envisaged at the time the initial 
infom1ation is given or collected.22 These information systems used in the collection and 
storage of such personal information can therefore pose considerable challenges to one's right 
to p1ivacy. As mobile money continues to grow, more sophisticated technology with 
considerable abilities to hold large amounts of information comes along with it, thus it is 
necessary to address privacy concerns with a law on data protection. 
1.4 STATEMENT 011 OBJECTIVES 
The main ohjective of this study is to investigate whether ihere is any law i:hat provtdes for 
data protection in Kenya. Data stored by mobile money transfer databases will be of 
importance a~ many Kenyans use this ~crvice and have their personal information stored by 
the said databases. The study wi ll also strive to a11olyse the data protection bii! and whether it 
adequately guarantees the right to privacy. 
The specific objectives of thi s study are: 
I. Critically examine the h·amcwork for Data protection in Kenya, if any . 
.!.. Dctenmne \vhc:ther curi·t:nt iegislation en piwacy · adeq;,1ate!y provides for uata · 
Protection in Kenya. 
3. Establish what has been the best practice with regards to Data Protection m 
jurisdictions that have progressive Data Protection Laws. 
4. Provide recommendations on how to strengthen the Data Protection Bill (20 13) based 
on findings of this study. 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This study will seek to answer the following questions: 
21 Makin P, ' Regulating Issues Arou nd Mobile Banking: New initiatives to bank the poor are straining the 
world's financial regulatory systems.' OECD, 2009, 13. 
~2 Makin P, ' Regulating Issues Arou nd Mobile Banking: New initiatives to bank the poor arc straining the 
world 's financial regulatory systems,· OECD. 2009, 13. 
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1. What type of data, associuterl with mobiie money transCcrs, should be protected by 
data protection laws? 
2. What are pettincnt privacy concems with regards to collection, retrieval, processing, 
storage, usc and disclosure of personal data associated with mobile money transfers in 
view of a lack of legislation that comprehensively caters for the data protection in the 
country? 
3. What is the current legal, institutional and regulatory framework for the collection, 
retrieval, processing, storage, use and disclosure of personal data associated with 
mob ile money transfers in the country? 
1.6 HYPOTHESIS 
This study will test the fo llowing hypotheses: 
1. There are few laws and regu lations governing the collection, storage, processing and 
use of personal data associated with mobile money transfers or any other personal 
' . 
data held by data controiiers and data agencies. 
. , 
2. Personal <.i:!ta associated with m obile mon<;?y transfers fa lls within the. reaims of data 
that should be covered by data protection laws. 
3. The Data Protection Bill adequately caters for protection of personal data. 
4. There is a 1 isk of ptivacy violations by data controllers or agencies in Kenya. 
1.7 RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
T he intended study w i!J be conducted throug;1 .a des.(< review of the current laws in the 
coumry L:1a~ sp."!t:tficalty promote •.w threaten illt: nght .to uiiohnation privacy, !'P-Ievanl 
academic joumal articles, and repotts concerning data protection with a siight bias towards 
data coll ected by telecommunication companies especially those involved in Mobile Money 
T ransfers. A case study will also be incorporated in this study so as to highlight best practice 
from a jurisdiction that has had similar concems with regard to data protection and mobi le 
money transfers and already has a data protection framework in place. 
1.8 LIMITATIONS 
The intended study will be majorly based on internet sources and reliance on best practices 
from other jurisdictions. The reason for this is because there is little to none about this topic 
that has been documented in books. of which if any, aren't easily accessible, and there is even 
less information on the subject in Kenya as it is a rapid ly developing area especia ll y due this 
7 
age of tcchno!ogicai adv.ancemems. Reference will be made towards Ghana whid1 . has in 
place a comprehens ive law on data protection and has set up a Commission on Data 
Protection in the country. This Study will also have a look at the United States and other 
western jurisdictions as a source of legislation, cases and regu latory framework due to their 
vast development in information privacy. Therefore, secondary sources of information will be 
the main basis for this research from which inference shall be made. 
1.9 CHAPTER BREAKDOWN 
Chapter I: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the paper by giving the background of the topic and reasons for the 
research. 
Chapter 2: Conceptaai/Theoretical Framework and m?thodology. 
This chapter deals· with tlae different legal theories that can be applied to the right to 
information privacy and data protection. Also, the principles that should infonn a 
comprehensive data protection law vvill be discussed within this chapter. 
Chapter 3: Study/analysis of the research questions 
. . 
This chapter will ccntain an examir.ation of the research questions by discussing case studiec; 
from other jurisdictions that have had similar Questions to answer. This chapter will also look 
. at the legislative framework with regards to the 'right to · iri formation privacy in Kenya and 
~ome of the present laws tha~ tiu·eaten the enjoyment of il1e rlgh~ to· ;Jrivacy. · 
Chapter 4: Comparative analysis 
This chapter will focus on highlighting the rcgulato1y framework of other jurisdictions with 
regards to data protection. Best practices from Ghana will be the basis of this comparative 
study. This wi ll be discussed vis-a-vis the regulatory framework and data protection 
mechanisms currently in place within Kenya. 
Chapter 5: Recommendations and conclusion 
This chapter will contain recommendations on what can be improved or changed within the 
current legal framework on data protection in Kenya so as to carefully and comprehensively 
provide lo r a data protection i11 Kenya. The chapter will a lso contain recommendations on 
8 
.·. 
how the · CltiTent Data Protection Bill can be impruved to Ponsur~ the r:ight · to information 
privacy is adequately safeguarded within the Kenyan legal framework. 
·. 
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CHAPTER 2- CONCEPTUAl:. Fl{AMEW01U< ·· 
From a reading of article 31 (c) of the Constitution, the right to privacy encompasses two 
main critical aspects. These are; the right to information privacy with regards to one's private 
affairs and the right not to have infotmation about these affairs revealed unnecessarily. A 
critical rc~ding of this section clearly shows that the right to privacy is a limitable right. The 
Constitution requires that where a right is to be limited, it shall only be done so, inter alia, by 
way of law and use of the least restrictive means possible.23 Currently, there is no enabling 
law or framework in the country providing for data protection or circumstances under which 
the right to privacy may be limited. This chapter will deal with the common law legal theoty 
and some of the principles that inf01m the need for privacy protection and in particular data 
protection. 
The theoretical basis for this study is derived from Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis' 
widely cited The Right to Privacy. The atticle was written after Warren and Bn111deis began 
noting new technological advancements •hat were posing a potential threat to privacy and 
focused on how the common law could develop to protect the interest then ca ll ed "privacy:· 
They described the term privacy as the riglzt to be let alone. The main purpose of their article 
was to demonstrate that many aspects of the right to privacy existed wtthin the common Jaw. 
The two authors observed and opined that m0rlern enterprise and invention have, tlu·qugh 
invasions upon his privacy, subjected an individual to mental pain and distress, far greater 
than could be effected by bodily injury. This type ofham1 was not provided for under tort Jaw 
' '" ~ I D I . , ' . . ' ' h. ~ ,.!' • ' • . .;,,,.;: .. - :-'1rly y.ears ater, .., r~:nu~· : . \I.""'C!O:t! !~ a~~~11n sf:en in :~ i?!TICI•.:: ~.:sscnttne e:pm:o1~ L': 
the case of Olmsted v United States. :5 ln this case, the court held that wiretapping was not a 
violation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment as it was not physical tr·espass. Brandeis, 
in a dissenting opinion, stated that the framers of the constitution "conferred as against the 
government the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men. " This case demonstrates that the absence of a proper legislative 
framework on right to privacy, patticularly on data protection, might lead to injutious privacy 
violations by data controllers or agents that go unpunished. 
~3 Article 24, Constitution of Kenya. (20 I 0). 
~4 WarrenS and Brandeis L, 'The Right to Privacy' Han•ard Law Review, I 890. 45. 
~> (I 938) 277 US Supreme Court. 
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Another theory that tries to explain the right to pnvacy !s the Personhood Theory. 
Personhood refers to those attributes of an individual' which arc irreducible to his selflwod.26 
This hints at the fact that privacy is concerned with the integrity and personality of a person. 
This personhood conception is fut1her developed by professor Benn who notes that privacy 
amounts to respect to individuals as choosers. "Respect for someone as a person, as a 
chooser, implies respect for him as one engaged in a kind of se((-creative enterprise ·w!tich 
could be dismpted distorted orji-ustrated even by so limited an intrusion as watching."27 This 
hints at the fact that consent is a key element of privacy. Individuals should be allowed, under 
the law, to choose what type of private infonnation they want to share with third pat1ies and 
fo r what duration of time such data will vest with such patties. 
In addition, data protection should be infonned by the data protection principles that are at 
the heru1 of protection of the right to privacy. 28 These principles are enumerated in iaws of 
the differem JUrisdictions that have a comprehensive iaw on data protection in places such as 
Ghana and the United Kingdom (UK). 
One such principle is :-tccountabili ty which imposes a duty of care qn data controller~ and ~-
any other person who processes data to ensure that such data is processed; without infringing 
the privacy rights of the data subject and in a lawful and reasonable manner?9 With respect to 
foreign data subjects, a data controller or processor should ensure that perso~al data is 
processed in compliance with data protection legislation of the foreign jurisdiction of that 
subject where personal data originating from that jurisdiction ts sent to this country · lor 
. . . : . . 
Another principle informing data protection is lawfulness of processing. This principle 
provides that data should onl y be processed if the purpose, for which it is to be processed, is 
necessary, relevant and not excessive.30 Also, inherent to this ptinciple is the concept of 
consent. A person should not process personal data of an individual without the prior consent 
26 Freund P , Privacy: One Concep1 or Many, Atherton Press, New York. 1971 42-43. 
27 Berm S. Privacy Freedom and Res peel for Persons, Atherton Press, New York, 197 1. 26. 
28 Data Protection Principles. https://ico.org.uk/for-on!anisations/guide-to-data-protection/data-protection-
principles/ on 16 September 201 7. 
!
9 Section 18, Act 843, Dma Pro/eel ion Acl (Ghana). 
30 The Eight Data Protection Principles, http://www.ed.ac.uk/records-managementldata-protectionlwhat-is-
it/principles on 16 September 201 7. 
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of the data subject, i.e. the individual, wit·h the ·exceptions to this to be clearly provided for 
uJtder written I a w. 31 
Intrinsic to this principle is also the proces~ of data coll ection and retention. Data should be 
collected directly from the data subject always and where such is not possible, the data 
subject should have consented to indirect collection. 
With regards to retention, data collected should not be retained for a longer period than is 
necessary to achieve the purpose for which the data is collected with exceptions to this to be 
clearly provided for under written law.32 
Data protection also requires that collected data be used for a specific purpose. Such purpose 
should be explicitly defined, lawful and related to the activities or functions of the data 
agent/processor. Further, where data is collect.ed by a third party, such data should be used 
only for the purposes fur which it was co'llected. This requirt:mem aims to ensure that 
organi<>ations are open about their reasons for obtaining personal data, and that what they do 
with the information is in line with the reasonable expectations of the individuals (data 
subjec.ts) concerned.3-' · 
', 
Compatibility of fut·tb<' r processing with purpose of collection is among ti~c principles 
informing data protection. This principle proposes that data collectors who holt! personal data 
collected for a specific purpose should ensure that further processing of the personal data is 
fv i that specific purpose.34 This effectively means that data collectors or data 
purpose, wiihout re-seeking cons<;nt of the data subject. 
It is also incumbent upon the data controller to ensure that collected data is maintained to 
required standards with regards to quality. Tl1is principle of quality of information requires 
data controllers to ensure that the data in their possession is complete, accurate, up to date 
and not misleading having regard to the purpose for the collection or processing of the 
31 Sections 19 & 20, Act 843, Da1a Prole..:lion Act (Ghana). 
32 University of Edinburgh: T he Eight Data Protection Principles, http://www.ed.ac.uklrecords-
management/data-protection/what-is-it/principles on 16 September 2017. 
33 Processing personal data for specified purposes (Principle 2), https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-
data-protectionlprinciple-2-purposes/ on 16 September 2017. 
3~ Data Protection Pri nciples, https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/data-protection-prineiples on 16 September 
2017. 
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personal data.35 Th is p•·i; t~iple is aiso in line with the Constitution of Kenya which stipul?.t.::s 
that every person has the right to the correction or deletion of untrue or misleading 
infonmHion that affects the person. 36 
Another overarching principlt: is op enness. This principle requires that data controllers 
should be duly registered by a statutory body in-charge of data protection within a given 
jurisdiction. The principle also requires data controllers to infmm data subjects of nature of 
data to be collected, name and address of person collecting, purpose of collection, whether 
the supply of data is mandatory or voluntary, consequences of failing to provide data, 
requirement by law for its collection, recipients of data, nature or category of the data, and 
finally, the existence of the right of access to and the right to request rectification of the data 
collected before the collection.37 
Data security safegua1·ds, as a principle. requires data controllers tv take the necessary steps 
to secure the integrity of personal data in the possession or control of a person through the 
adoption of appropriate, reasonable, technical and organisational measures to prevent: loss of, 
Jamage to, or unauthorized destmction; and unlawful acces~ to or U!i3uthorized processing of 
personal data.38 This in effect me~ns that data controliers are to put up tight secUiity in their 
storage systems such as firewalls and encryption keys or adopt storage models that will not 
expo~c information into risk of external tampering or theft. 
Finally, as a principle, the da ta s ubject sh ould be a llowed to particip a te, a t will, in t he 
processing of collected data that con cerns hi m . Such paittcipati\m shall include access to 
infonnC:J!Ivn held by a data co.1t1:oiler or at;y ~thet: third part). A dat..t co~irc,ller slv=tll comply 
with such request and give a description of the data in its possession as well as identity of a 
third party with access to such infmmation. A data subject may also request a data controller 
to correct information in its possession. A data controller should comply with such request or 
provide credible evidence in support of such data. 39 
35 Data Protection Principles, https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/data-protcction-principles on 16 September 
2017. 
36 Article 35 (2). Constitution of Kenya (20 I 0). 
37 Data Protection Principles, https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/data-protection-principles on 16 September 
2017. 
38 Data Protection Principles, https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/data-proteetion-principles on 16 September 
2017. 
•<> Data Protection Principles, https://www.dataprotection.org.gh/data-protection-principles on 16/9/2017. 16 
September 20 I 7. 
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Th·· Data Protection Bill (20 13) under clause 4 provides for ~~~ (;se principles albeit 
inadequately. The bill, in outlining the principles, fails to clearly establish who bears the duty 
of care with regards to personal data already collected by data collectors but not in their 
possession. It also fails to provide for a principle governing indirect collection of data from 
data subjects. 
The right to be let alone, as propounded by Wan·en and Brandeis, the personhood theory and 
the data protection principles as explained above are thus seen to be at the heart of right to 
infom1ation privacy. This right gives rise to a negative obligation against the govemment and 
any other person or entity not to interfere with the affairs of an individual without prior 
consent. With the rising magnitude of information now held by telecommunication 
companies, banks and other data controllers and/or data agents' due to the rise of mobile 
money 1n Kenya, a comprehensive law on data protection needs to be e1:acted to provide a 
framework on how to uphold the privacy of such data and any other data that is of a personal 
nature. 
. ~ .. . 
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CHAI'fER3- D.ATA PROTECTION _FRAMEWORK IN KENYA 
3.1 Information privacy in a digital space 
"The fact that technology now allows an individual to cany such information in his hand 
does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders 
fought_"- US Supreme Court Chief Justice Jo~ Roberts in Riley v Califomia (20 14)-40 
The 21st century has become the century of big data.41 Advanced Information Technology 
systems now allow for the storage and processing of large amounts of data. The revela6ons of 
Edward Snowden42 have demonstrated that these wo1Ties are not only real but also that the 
technical capabilities to collect, store and search large quantities of data concerning telephone 
conversations, intcmet searches and electronic payment, as well as mobile money transfers, 
are now in place and ar·.: routinely used by government in collaboration with corporations. 
Technological innovation has. over time, triun~phed over our privacy protections.43 This ha~ 
resulted i11 0ur digital footprint being vu lnerable to tracking by the govcmment and 
telecommunications c..~~· other corporations in ways that were one~ unfathomable. 
This digital footprint is constantly growing, containing more and mort~ data about the most 
iutimate aspects of our lives. This is especially more true for mobile money transactions in 
Kenya. Other such data that can be held by corporations includes our communications, 
whereabouts, and online searches among oth0rs. When the government has easy access to this 
infonnation, we lose more than just privacy and control over •)ur information. Free speech, 
. . . 
sc;;mity, ancl equalri.~.r might end up suffering as welL 
M-PESA, a mobile-enabled money transfer and payment service by Safaricom Limited 44, is 
considered to be the pioneer mobile-money platform in Kenya.45 With nearly 40% of the 
40 Olmsted vUniled States (1938) 277 US Supreme Cou rt438. 
41 Big data is data sets !hat arc so voluminous and complex that tradilional dala processing application software 
arc inadequate to deal with them. Big data challenges include caplllring data, data storage. data analysis, search, 
sharing, transfer, visualization, querying, updating and informalion privacy. 
42 Edward Srowden: Leaks that exposed US spy programme, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-
23123964 on I 3 December 2017. 
43 Privacy and Technology, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology on 13 December 2017. 
+~ Safaricom is Kenya's largest telecommunications company by net profit as well as the most profitable 
company in East Africa, https:/ /www.businessdai lyafrica.com/Safaricorn-sets-new-record-as-rnarket-value-hits-
Sh630bn/-/539552/2658306/-/2rh06 j/-/index.html on 13 December 2017. 
45 Muthiora B, E11abling Mobile J\lfoney Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digilal Fi11ancia/ Revol111io11, GSlvfA 
Mobile Mooney for /he Unbauked, Bill & Belinda Gates Foundation 20 15, 9. 
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ar\dt po'pulc.lion excluded from financial inclusivity .. 4 (- M-PESA W~:) revoiuti~.nary in that it 
increased financial inclus,on in the country to more than 60% of the adult population when i t 
came into operation around March 2007.47 Unfortunately, this mobile money platfonn, as 
well as many others in the country, operates in an environment where there is no specific law 
that protects customer data considering the huge volumes of data that they hand le. 
While the Central Bank of Kenya Act gives the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) discretion to 
"formulate and implement such policies as best promote the establishment, regulation and 
supervision of efficient and effective payment, clearing cmd settlement systems", ·'8 the Act is 
weak on the statutory authority required for the CBK to issue regulations on payment services 
generally. As such, privacy concerns as well as other issues such as safety of customer funds 
were not well addressed. As will be discussed later in this paper, this statutory authority was 
granted when the National Payment System Act was enacted in 2012. However, privat:y 
conc~rn& were not adequar.dy catered for as w!li be discussed !mer. 
A look at the business ;node! adopted · by mo~t Mobile Money Operators 
(telecommunications) and approved by the CBK, reveals that .. the CBK al10ws 
telecomuwnications to issue mobile money in exchange (at par value)· for cJ ~!t held u: a trust 
account under the custody of a trustee. Because the funds held in trust are separated from the 
funds of the service provider, the service provider is unable tu use the funds and the money is 
safe from claims by creditors in the event of insolvency. Over time, as the size of the trust 
account increases, as the mot~.ite money service grows in popularity, the ·tw stee, 111 
reduce the risk of a single custodiar b<'nk failure. 49 This model , albeit guaranteeing the safety . 
of customer funds, would see telecommunications collect a lot of customer personal 
info1mation. This is because telecommunications wou ld oversee all mobi le money 
transactions canied out by their subscribers (customers). 
In March 2014, there were 26.2 million mobile money accounts in Kenya and an estimated 
12.5 million unique active users. That same month, 73.9 mil lion transactions were reported, 
with a dai ly average of 2.38 million transactions or 27.5 transactions per second and a 
.16 Muthiora B. Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fos;ering a Digital Financicd Revolwion. GSMA 
Mobile Mooney for the Unbanked, 9. 
47 Muthiora B, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: .Fostering a Digital Financial Revolwion. GSMA 
Mobile Mooney for the Unbanked, 9. 
48 .. 
Section 4(A) and (d). Centra/Bank o.fKenya Act (CAP. 491). 
49 Muthiora B, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financial Revolution. GSMA 
J\llohi/e Mooney for the Unbanked. l l. 
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throughput value of KES !92.6 billion . (USD 2~2 · • bilhon), prin1arily !ow-value . retail 
transfers.50 Mobile money users can make peer-to-peer (P2P) transfers, bill payments, and 
merchant payments, as well as receive social disbursements and international remittances. 
With 26.2 million mobile money accounts and 12.5 million active mobile money users, 
Kenya now has one of the highest mobile money penetration rates anywhere in the w~rld. 51 
The success that mobile money has had on enabling the access to financial services for 
millions of Kenyans who were previously unbanked is unparalleled. Access to formal 
financial services bas increased from 26% of Kenya's bankable population in 2006 to 67% in 
2013.52 Mobile phone financial services have played a key role in this. What began as money 
transfer services has now become a platform with a menu of financial services that includes 
money transfers, payments of goods and services, savings, credit, insurance, pensions, and 
even capital market products. 53 
More often than not, personal data is usually linked to mobile money transfers. Such data can 
include, date of birth, gender, whereabouts. the Internet Protocol (lP) address of your mobile 
dev,cc and metadata pertaining to the various kind of transactions invol:ved. 54 Daw wh1cl1 i" 
used to secure other infonnati0n, for example passwords, will not be discussed in this paper. 
3.1 Privacy Concerns 
a. Transpar·ent Use withou t P r·ivacy Protection 
According to fA TF Recommendations I 0 and II , financial in:.;titutions should not allow 
customers to condw;t ous1:1ess anonymously; and rhey-rnu:::;t mairit~·in -us~; .. trans'actinn '~~..:ords , 
for five years.':> ln most traditional banking settings, this requirement is both sens~ble and 
non-controversiaL It does, however, raise significant questions for mobile money operators, 
particularly considCJing the limitations of privacy protections in Africa and in particular 
Kenya. For instance, a recent UN rep011 noted that amongst the members of the EAC -
50 Muthiora 8 , Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fos1ering a Digiwl Financial Revolution, GSMA 
lylobile Mooney for the Unbanked. 15. 
>I Muthiora B. Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financial Revolution. GSMA 
Mobile Mooney for the Unbo11ked, 6. 
52 Muthiora B, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financial Revolwion, GSMA 
Mol>i/e Mooney for the Unbanked, foreword. 
Muthiora B, Enabling Mobile Money Policies in Kenya: Fostering a Digital Financitli Re1•olution. GSMA 
Mobile Mooney for the Unbanked. foreword. 
54 Privacy and Information Technology, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ it-privacy/ on 13 December 2017 
55 F ATF, llllernational Standards on Combating Money Laundering and I he Financing of Terrorism & 
Proliferation: The FATF Recommenc/(l(ions. 2012, 16. 
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Bmundi, Kenya; t<.wand:1, T:-.; tiania, anu Uganda- then.: is no legislation "th<l! clearly defin~s 
who can gel access to a mobile money trail , and how, when or under what conditions such 
access may be obtained."56 lnadequate privacy protections can lead to abuse by governments 
and data brokers as well as leave personal infom1ation susceptible to thctl or leakage, 
ultimately damaging user trust and limiting adoption and use. 57 
b. Limited P rivacy P rotections 
A number of reasons can be given to try and explain the limits of privacy protection in 
Kenya. First, a strong communitarian strain exists throughout much of Africa as in Kenya. 
This mind set deemphasizes the rights of individuals in favour of those of community. In 
such a context, the privacy of individuals is given little consideration.58 Second, h·aditional 
economies with limited electronic communicatio: : and commerce have less need for 
individual privacy protection as there are fe'.v means to collect, use; and exploit sensitive 
inf01mation. Until very recently, the vast majority of Africans did not engage in data 
compiling transactions. For both of the reasons above, there are few e~labl i she::d lega l 
prvto.;:.-tions in Aftican natio11s. Kenya included. Most nations do no~. fonna lly recognize a 
right to personal privacy, and most do ilOI have laws or regulator~ in place to monitor abuse. 59 
Compounding the lack of legal protections is the relative absence of public interest groups to 
monitor government b\!haviour, propose public policy, and promote awareness. This leads to 
situations where serious abuses can occur with little impediment. Even in South Africa or 
Ghana, where some legal protections arc in place, ilkgal i_:11_erception and abuse of electronic 
"~'lJml'Pj·,..,...rf· ' 11 <: I.._ V ~- -!1;1; "'! . . ,. }l{ln"', .~ •\ ( · . , l'(V: 1 ;Y,~ 60 \"'11;!. , ~ !:. ""l;l.'"f D"'; , .. : .. ,, ,. •• •i''' ' 
__.. "' ~ ; \ .. t * • • •:• •• - ~~ • .,.. '"""\ •• ,...., • • . ._ •••• • '· It t ·' - . .. ! '·. ! _,_ . • ~J \ _ •• •• 
:·egune may have L:aust:d little concern just a short time ago. th~ ·Afiican boom in mobile 
telephony significantly heightens the risk to consumers operating in an ecosystem without 
protection. This is especially true for Kenya where mobile money use and uptake is 
unparalleled. 
56 UN Conference on Trade and Oevelopmcfll, 'Mobile Money for Business Developmem in the East African 
Community: A Comparative Study on Existing Platforms and Regulations, · 20. 
57 llarris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Africa' Was!Jiugtou .lou mal o.f Lmv, Technology and A u s 20 13, 249. 
58 Goodman Sand l larris A, 'Emerging Markets: The Coming African Tsu nami of Information lnsecunty,' Vol 
53 No 12. Communiccuions o.ftlte ACM, December 20 I 0. 24 
59 llanno N, Olinger. Johannes J. Britz & MartinS Olivier. ·western 
privacy and/or Ubuntu? Some critical comments on the influences in the forthcoming data 
ft rivacy bil l in South Afi·ica,' 39: I , 1l1e lntemmioua/Injormmiou & Librw:v Review, 2007, 35 
0 lleidi Swart, Secret State: /low the Govemment Spies on You , Mai l & Guardian ( 14 October 20 II), 
http://mg.eo.za/anicle/20 11-1 0-14-secret-state/ on 18 December 20 17. 
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c. Potential for abuse 
Tn the context of limited privacy protections and because FATF requires identity verification 
and data collection, data subjects may find their privacy threatened by governmental and 
corporate abuse. In cash-based economies, like Ken~a, the spending and savings activities of 
individuals are known to an interested third party only with great cffort.61 Th is is the 
environment that most Africans have come to understand, developing social behaviours 
reflective of spending that is anonymous to government and corporate entities. Despite a lack 
of privacy protections, the inherent anonymity of cash prevents any other entity from 
knowing the extent of an individual's transactions. However, due to FATF requirements, the 
service provider can and must record every detail of a user's transactions in a mobile money 
environment. It is also imp01tant to note that the initial wave of mobile phone adoption was 
I 
anonymous, as the vast majority of users purchaseti and used unregistered pre-paid phones. 
tv1Dny African nations, inciuding Kenya, arc now reversing this initiai trend by requiring 
SIM-card r(;gistration, further reducing anonymity and potentially iimitin~ pri\'ate use.62 The 
availability of rnobi le-money transaction data opens the door for abuse by •ln u~t;.;c: rupulous . 
government, which cmtld gain a~ccss to transactiOn r~cords with little effort.63 Tbis 
inf01mation could then be used in a number of ways to harass. !ntirrridatc, '?.r m~~,irulate the 
violated citizen. 
A fully employed mobile money ecosystem can include a mobile network operator 
(Teiecc:1mmnications Company), financial institution, tTusted service manager, marketer, 
a growing it:,cr.:st in collecting personal information tied to mobile money trar.sa~ticns . With 
so many interested pa11ies and little consumer protection, the opp01tunities for data leakage 
and subsequent abuse are abundant.64 
It is vital to be cognisant of the fact that the threats of data leakage are amplified in a mobile 
money environment because how we spend is an important predictor of who we are and how 
61 llarris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, 'Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Africa' 250. 
6~ llemeson C. 'Directive on Consumer Data for SIM Card Registration in the Telecommunications Sector: An 
African Perspective: Chikaodili J Hemeson. 2012. 7. Available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=I982033 on 18 
December 20 I 7. 
6
J Koker Land Jentzsch N, 'Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity: Aligned Incentives?' Proceedings of the 
20 I I Shadow conference, Munster, Germany, 28-3 1 July 20 II , 24. 
6
" Harris A, Frank S, Goodman Y, Traynor P, • Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for Digital Wallet 
Deployment' in Aspray W, Doty P (eds), Privacy in America: lnterdisciplinm:J' Perspectives, Scarecrow Press, 
2011. !85. 
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we will c;pclid or po~:sih!y otherwis~ behave in the future. Since FA TF requires recording ~;[ 
user transactions by mobile money operators, th:s infonnation is necessarily compiled and 
available for use. The ability to connect basic personal information to spending records 
obtained through mobile phones has great commercial usc-and potentially misuse. In places 
where mobiie money is not yet exi:ensively used, like North America and Europe, a spending 
record connected to the user's mobile phone is less accessible or not available at all, so 
nations in these regions have not yet needed to wrestle fully with the implications of mobile 
money data.65 But in Africa, particularly Kenya, mobile money data sets are quickly 
growing.66 As Kenyans also begin to use their phones to access the Internet, the incentives to 
commoditize this data will grow and present challenges yet unseen in Western nations. 
The great potential for abuse of personal information can harm not only the violated data 
subjects, but also the overa!i economy. If governments and telecommunications as well as 
other corporauous aLuse users' i.n!st, they w!li curtail &doptiou aHct limit :hi:! utiiity of.raobde 
money, thuc; limning the application's utility am! holurng back dcvclvrm·~'1t within tbe 
country. In most African nations. there is little to stop governments or corporations from 
pu~bing the boundaries of acceptable use with regards to revealing mobile money dataY li 
widespn.:ad abuse becomes commonplace, users may walk a\'!ay from mobile money and all 
its enormous benefits. 
3.3 The need fo r data protection in Kenya 
Kenya's current legislation docs not defin~ who can get access tc a mobile money trai l and 
• • • 0 
ho·:v, WhC! l Or unrler Wi1M conditions such ac~~~S may be obt a: r:~J: fh.~ COI'flpiic~tes efforts to 
keep consumer inf01mation private while at the same time contlicts with the desire for 
regu lators to keep customer funds safe against financial crimes. In addition, the privacy 
regulations that apply to commercial banks in respect of customer financial records do not 
extend to telecommunications dealing with mobile money transfers.68 
<•' I larris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Africa· 251. 
66 I larris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ·Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Africa' 251. 
67 ll arris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, 'Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
ApplicatiOns in Afhca'252. 
68 Malala J, 'Consumer Protection for Mobi le Payments in Kenya: An Exam ination of the Fragmented 
Legislation and the Complexities it Presents for Mobile Payments' Kenya Bankers Association, KBA Centre for 
Research on Financial Markets and Policy Working Paper Series WPS/02/ 14, 2013, 34 -
htt•J://www.kba.co.ke/downloads/Working%20Paper"lo20WPS-07-13.pdf on 20 Dc<;crnbcr 2017. 
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1\ncl•·';:··.v Harris, Seymour Goodman, and Patrick T1 aynor· in thei :· p::!~•\.!1' on P.rivm..:y and 
Security Concerns Associated ·.vith Mobile Money Applications in .1fi'ica note that, in a cash 
based economy, such as Kenya, the spending and savings activities of individuals are known 
to an interested third pa11y only with great effort as stated before. Spending is anonymous to 
govemment and corporate entities. However, with mobile money transfers, which art very 
prevalent in Kenya, the service provider can and must record every detail of a user's 
transactions in a mobile money environment.69 This in effect eliminates the anonymity that 
would have been there had cash been used as some personal data might be recorded by the 
service provider e.g. name of person doing the money transfer, item purchased (if it was a 
sale), place of transaction, and amount spent among other data usually collected. The 
availability of transaction data opens the door for abuse by an unscmpulous government, 
which cou ld gaio access to tr.msaction records with little effo_rt. This infonnaticn 1-ol!!d then 
be usc:d in ·a number o f ways to harass, intimidate, profile or· manipulate !he violated data 
subject. 
Cvrporate abuse of personal information can similarly have insidious effects in the mobile 
money environment of Kenya without legal safcgtJ~rds. Mobi·le money scr\:ices necessarily 
operate in a data rich cnvii·orunent thal incentivises f.'Jr the commodification of personal 
infonnation from and thus target-ed advertising. Liberal collecting and sharing policies result 
in •..:lccrronic dossiers useful for not only providing targeted advertising, but also for making 
decisions regarding employn' •:nt or credit wot1hiness as well as for committing fraud.70 
Protection in Tanzania note') that, wher. ·pC'rsonal data is protc~;ted, automatically the right to 
privacy is guaranteed.71 He ftuther notes that the Electronic and Postal Communications Act 
of Tanzania mandatorily requires that every holder of a SIM card to register the SIM card. ln 
Tanzania, the registration data is a very huge collection of personal data including 
information and copies of documents such as driving license, traveling pass, social security 
ID card and so on, all which can be subject to misuse if not properl y protected.72 However, 
69 Harris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Afi'ica' 250. 
70 llarris A, Goodman S and Traynor P. ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Africa ' 252. 
71 Mitake M, 'Mobile cellular Communication and its Effect on Personal Data Protection in Tanzania' 
Unpublished LLM Thesis. Facuhy of Law. University of Oslo, 15 May :w 14, 20. 
n Mitakc M, 'Mobile cellu lar Communication and its Effect on Personal Data Protection in Tanzania' 
Unpublished LLM Thesis. Faculty of Law. University of Oslo. 15 May 2014. 24. 
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there is a provision in the same bw v.-hicl1 pro\· idr~ .[or protectio11 of such data after it has 
been collected by the relevant authorities from misuse and abuse by the co llee;t ing authorities 
and other third parties. 73 Due to absence of such a law in Kenya as earlier stated, this makes 
personal data collected by telecommunication companjes involved in mobi le money transfers 
vulnerable to misuse and abuse. 
It is however prudent to bear in mind that the above article only considers personal data that 
is used when registering a SIM card in Tanzania and not personal data associated with mobile 
money transfers as is the case with this study. 
Paul Makin, a principal consultant at Consult Hyperion, which was the fi rm charged with 
overseeing the conception and development of M-PESA,74 raises some various issues in his 
analysis a~·out regulation of the mobile money services. He notes that wit!· mobile money 
sep:ices there is huge comprehensive set of .reporting and management tools, which allow 
detailed views 2nd reporting or every aspect of every transaction, both individually and en 
masse. Customt.r in!'ormation is also stored in !rue end-to-end encrypted SIMs, where all 
conficlelllial customer data ;s held. 75 Insofar as thi ~ is a very progressiv..: step in curbing 
money laundering or financing of tetTOrist activities as it plll<; a check to the trail of money, it 
would be very unfortunutc if sllch daia is not further protected though ti:lta ;~··otection law. 
Such data would be prone to abuse and anisuse by telecommunications t·ompanies, the 
govemment or data brokers. 
Th~ following are moral reasons for the protection of personal data :.md for provi?-ing dire..:t 
Of indii·~ct cotmol over ~c~·~ss ~~ ·thus\: data b~ otlwr<; mclt•de; "' 
1. Prevention of hann: Unrestricted access by others to one's passwords, 
characteristics, and whereabouts can be used to hann the data subject in a variety 
of ways. 
73 Section 93, Electronic and Postal Communications Act (Tanzania, 2011 ). 
74 M-PESA is a Mobile Money Service offered by Kenya's leading Telecommunications Company, Safaricom. 
It began running on March 2007 as the first of its kind in Kenya and Africa at large. lt facilitates Mobile Money 
Transfers among subscribers to the network cheaplf and reliably through their mobile phones. lt also offers 
other facilities such as the ability to store small amounts of money in one's phone and to pay for services using 
money loaded in one's mobile wallet - https://www.safaricom.eo.ke/personal/m-pesa/getting-started/experiencc-
m-pesa on 13 December 20 1 7. 
75 Makin P, ' Regulating Issues Around Mobile Banking: New initiatives to bank the poor are straining the 
world's financial regulatory systems,' OECD, 2009, 7. 
76 Privacy and Information Techno lo~w, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/ on 13 December 2017. 
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11. Informational inequality: Personal data havl: bccome·coP"!;; ,odities. Individuals are 
usually not in a good position to negotiate contracts about the usc of their data and 
do not have the means to check· whether partners live up to the tenns of the 
contract. Data protection laws, regulation and goveri1ance aim at establishing fair 
conditions for drafting contracts about personal data transmission and exchange 
and providing data subjects with checks and balances, guarantees for redress. 
111. Infotmational injustice and discrimination: Personal inf01mation provided in one 
sphere or context (for example, health care) may change its meaning when used in 
another sphere or context (such as commercial transactions) and may lead to 
disctimination and disadvantages for the individual. 
iv. Encroachment :on moral autonomy: Lack of privacy may expose individuals tcr .. 
outside forces that .influence thci r choices. 
These formulations all provide good moral reasons for limiting and constraining access to 
personal data and providing individuals with control over· their data. This is more so true . .. 
looking at lhe current situation in Kenya with regards to mubile money translers. 
3.4 A look at current data protection framework and legislation that· threatens 
information privacy 
Currently, there is no legislation that specifically caters for data protection within the country. 
However, as stated earlier the ConstiLUlioP outlines the entrenching provision with regards to 
' -·. 
clara pr~teclton under atuclt 3 l (CJ & (d~. 
The failure of a comprehensive law on data protection is further aggravated by vanous 
legislations that threaten the right to privacy. 
The Registration of Subscribers of Telecommunications Services Regulations (2014) of the 
Kenya Jnfonnation and Communications Act (1998) requires operators to provide the 
Communications Authority "access to its systems, premises, facilities, tiles, records and other 
data to enable the Commission inspect. .. "77 This provision puts individuals' privacy at risk as 
it is not clear as to the limitations of data, which is usually contained in the systems, which a 
telecommunications shculd provide for inspection. 
77 Section 13, Kenya Information and Commwticarions Act (Registration of Subscribers uf Telecommunications 
Services Regulmions. 20 14) (Act No.2 of 1998). 
23 
The National Intelligence Sc1 vice Act (20-12) ~;stablisnes the authonty" ·of the Director-
General to intercept individual communications when he or she "has reCJ!;onable grounds to 
believe that a covert operation is necessary to enable the National Intelligence Service (NIS) 
to investigate or deal with any threat to national security or to perform any of its functions."78 
This provision again further delimits the right to information privacy as mobile money 
transfers as primarily communication between ones phone and his or her mobile service 
provider (Telecommunication Company). This communication is subject to interception by 
the NIS by vi1tue of this provision. This power, however much checked by the judiciary/9 
can still be abused as it is commonly alleged that the NIS possesses direct access to 
telecommunications networks today and are capable to obtain digital content and data without 
prior judicial notice or authorisation. An enactment of a law on data protection would 
howe\'.:r crimina lise unauthorised access of data thereby making the ' NIS liable to pay 
':Ompensation for any damage it might occasion ;:;.n individual by !':uch a breach of his or her 
priv?cy. St:-:h a iaw wouitl most certainly make mobile money transfer records safer as it 
would reduce the likelihood of potential abuse by state apparatus. Privacy violations by 
government would thu::. only be clone in m~tters ~hat are of utmost im~ortance tor w~~,.j , it 
can be prove11 s-:>. 
The Prevention of TcJTori~m t\..;! (20 12) was amended by the adoption of th~ t:.~;;nya Securi1~1 
Laws (Amendm.::nt) Act of 2014. A new provision was introduced which allows for 
interce~"tion of communication by the National Security Organs. The-se organs may now . . 
intercept communication for the purposes of detecting, deteti"ing and disrupting terrorism in 
-
accordanCI;! wi!n. Cive~.-dur~s tu l"le prescribed by th-:: Cabinet s~cFetary. :." Alsv, th~ "clane;; 
provision provides that, the right to privacy under A1ticle 31 of the Constitution shall be 
limited for the purpose of intercepting communication directly relevant in the detecting, 
detening and disrupting terrorism. This limitation, in and of itself, is unconstitutional by 
virtue of mticle 24 (1) (e) of the Constitution in that it doesn't expressly state whether only 
article 31 (d) is limited or the whole of article 31 which goes beyond only privacy of 
communication but also includes privacy of person, home, property and information relating 
to an individual's family and/or private affairs. 
78 Section 42(2), National Intelligence Sen>ice Acl (No. 28 of 20 12). 
79 Section 42(3) and (d), National Intelligence Service Act (No. 28 of 20 12). 




A1ticle 35 f•f the ConstitutiOP . ,f KenyR provtdes that every citizen has the rig.ht of access t~) 
inf01mation held by the state and infom1ation held by another person and required for the 
exercise or protection of any right or fundamental freedom. This provision, in and of itself~ 
would perhaps work against the principles of data protection enumerated in chapter 2 of this 
study. The Access to Information Act 2016, which is the entrenching law with regards to 
article 35 provides for the framework under which infonnation may be obtained. The act 
guarantees the freedom to inf01mation by every citizen and mandates public or private 
entities to provide information sought at a reasonable cost.81 The act futther provides that, 
pursuant to article 24 of the Constitution on limitation of rights, the right of access to 
information under article 35 of the Constitution sha ll be limited in respect of information 
whose disclosure is likely to involve the unwarranted invasion of the privacy of an individual, 
other than the applicant or the person on whose ~;::half an application has, with proper . 
authority. been made.82 C~"riairly, infmmati0.n rr-lating to an individua l's mobiie. money 
transactions, if acquired arbitraril y would amount to an uir:'aJTarited invasion of privacy of an 
individual. Addttiomllly, it is not clear how one should go abou;- in obtaining_ authority .of an . . 
ind; ,,:dual with regards to th~ !imitation in section 6(1) (b). This agaH; !eaves individuals_in a 
precatious posttion as the law provides that prior authorisatioti !c; m:cded for 1• ·ivacy sensitive 
l!tJOJma:ion acquisition but it doesn't provide a framew0rk for obtaming S<·:h authority. 
These legislations c learly show that there is indeed a dire need fur a data protei..': ;on ·law in th~.­
country that not only pmtects individuals' .data, bnl also outlines the procedure for the 
(;Olk.:ction, retrieval. processing, storage, use and. di sclosure of. such cia!•~ . 
,, . 
81 Section 4 (2), Access to !nfhrmatioll Act (Act No 3 1. of20 16). 
S! Section (1) (d), Access 10 '' !formation Act. 2016 (Act No.3! of2016). 
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~CHAPT!:~ 4 -:COM PARAT iVE ST UDY OF LEQ'ISLAT10N ·H~ . G HANA.. AND 
KENYA 'S DATA PROTECTION BILL 
Data protection laws are present in most developed economies with advanced payment 
systems. The centrally unifying moral principle underlying these laws is the requirement of 
infonned prior consent [or processing by the data subject. 83 More to obtaining consent; 
processing of personal information mandates that its purpose be specified, its use b limited, 
individuals be notified and allowed to COITect inaccuracies, and the holder of the data be 
accountable to oversight authorities. 84 Because it is not possible to guarantee com pi iance of 
all types of data processing in all these areas and applications with these rules and laws in 
traditional ways, so-called privacy-enhancing technologies and identity management systems 
are expected to replace human oversight in many cases. Thus the challenge we are now faced 
with regarding privacy in the twer.~y-first century, world over, is to assure that technology is " 
designed..i'n suc..:h a way tha! it inc:orporates privacy requirements in the software; .architecture, 
infrastructure, and work process':"s in a ·.vay tliat makes privacy violations unlikely to occur. 
Over the last decade, mobile telephony has enjoyed phenomenal adoption rates across most 
uf Africa. Since 2005, there has been a five-fold incn::ase ·in the number of African mobile 
phone subscriptwns resultn~g in 53.1 mobile phone sub,.criptions per 100 inhabi-tants: in 
201 1.85 While other parts of the worid have .embr:1c:c·d mobile pbones to a greater degree, the 
relative impact in the African Continent, where fixed telephone lines are avai1a1) Je to less than 
2 per ~ent86 of the population, is perhaps greater than anywhere else. As the primary means of ·. 
communication for most ·Africans, mobile phon-.:s have become a source of significan.;: 
e~onomi:-- grow~it and a piauonn tor inno·.n!i•_,,~, t)ne . of the ·most c:n1amic of ·these 
i1movations has been mobile money, as highlighted earlier in this paper, the use of mobile 
phones to send and receive money as well as purchase goods or services tlu·ough funds 
connected to the user's account With a broad base of mobile phone users, already in place, 
the widespread adoption of mobile money could have enormous positive impacts across 
Africa. On a continent with too few banking options necessary for a dynamic and modern 
economy, mobile money has the potential to address long-existing gaps in African 
83 Pri vacy and Information Technology, https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/it-privacy/. on 13 December 2017. 
8~ Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and T rans-borde:· Flows of Personal Data, 
http://www .oecd. org/i n temet/i econom vI oecdgu ide I i neson t heprotecti onofp ri vacyandtransbordern ow so fpersonal 
data.htm on 13 December 2017. 
85 Key Global Telecom Indicators for the World Telecommunication Service Sector, http://www.itu.int/ITU-
D/ict/statistics/at glance/keytelecom.htm l on 13 January 2018. 
86 Harris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, 'Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in All·ica' 247. 
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econotvicc:.s·· Ui1fOJ1UHa1 \~ ~;t, the rapi._; growth of ri1obile telephony in Af1:ic<J ha::: iargely nt'' . 
been accompanied by appropriate consideration f,g privacy and security concerns, open.ing 
the door for abuse and erosion of the application's utility. 
Ghana, just like Kenya, has robust mobile money operations. According to the most recent 
Financial Inclusion insights (Fll) survey, access to formal financial services in Ghana 
increased by 41 per cent between 20 I 0 and 20 15, largely thanks to the uptake of Mobile 
Money. 88 Fll is the leading program produces original data and practical knowledge on trends 
in mobile money and other digital financial services for over I 0 African countries.89 ln June 
2016, the Central Bank of Ghana released figures showing that Mobile Money transactions in 
Ghana had grown 20 per cent since the end of 2015, reaching 679.71 million Ghanaian Cedi 
($177.9 million).90 This, compared to Kenya 's mobile money transactions of the same year 
... 
makes Ghana the second ..:o~;;-1try after Kenya in tenns of volumes of mobi le money 
. . .. . 9' ' I . ' . - I . . . 
. . ~ra:1~<t1.:'t!')Jt:> ·:: r\.iTiC<• :~!!u .~encc the !'CH~Oil tc lovJ, ~~ r ) mtnH :n comprH·tso!! m Kenya. 
Dc;;pne K en~'a 's huge mubiie money transfet:. \ 0 iumes. Ghana Ltnlik:c i(Pnva has a iegal 
framework already in place for data protec tion. 
4.1 Ghana 
The O<.i•a h ·ntcction Act, 2012 (Act 843)'>:.. sets out the ruk<> and princip les ;_!Oveming the 
collection, use, di::;clo~urc and care an individuars perso,1al data or information by a tlata 
controller or processor. It recognises a person's right (data subject rights) to protect their 
personal data or infom1ation by mandati ng a data controiier or p~·ocessor to process (collect, 
individual's rights. The Act also established the Data Protection Commission as an 
independent statutory body to ensure and enforce compliance. 
ln Ghana, the recognition of the right to privacy with respect to the processing of personal 
data or information led to the passage of the Act 843 to further guarantee the right to privacy 
87 Mobile Money in Africa : Press I for Modernity, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/215535JO 
on I 3 January 20 I 8. 
88 How Ghana is us:ng Mobile Money to go cashless, http:/lafrica.businesschief.com/technology/')521 /How-
Ghana-is-using-Mobile-Money-to-go-cashless on I 4 January 20 I 8. 
89 Practical Insightful Research to change the course of Lives http://finclusion.org/ on 14 January 2018. 
90 How Ghana is using Mobile Money to go cash less, http://africa.businesschief.com/technology/2521/How-
Ghana-is-using-Mobile-Money-to-go-cashless on 14 January 2018. 
9 1 Ghana Banking Survey: I low to Win in an Era of Mobile Money, A 20 I 6 report by PwC on Ghana 's Banking 
Industry. https://www.pwc.com/gh/en/assets/pd f/20 16-banking-survey-report.pdf on 18 January 2018. 
92 Preamble. Act 843. Data Protection Ac1. 2012 (Ghana). 
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en~:bri~~:. i.J under Artide 18(2) of the 1992 Constitution. Large am•;:;nts ·persoual data 
generated in the country are k.~pt across servers, networks and various fil ing systems in 
different locations (electronically & manually), locally and abroad. These have the potential 
of being sha red by different legal and natural persons, across borders in a way that violates 
the right to privacy. 
The Act provides standard principles that must be complied with by all who process personal 
information across the country and beyond. 93 The law applies to all forms of personal data or 
inf01mation stored on both electronic and non-electronic platforms including mobile money 
related information.94 
The Act is premised on the fundamental rule that all who process personal data must take into 
consideration the ,·ight of that mdividual to the privacy of his or her communications. This 
. recogr•itwn by a date: r.0ntrol!er or processer should ·lead to the appli~ati_0n <;f the Eight (8) 
" ~ .. 
Basic Prii1c ipl~s whiles processmg such inlonnation highlighted in chapter 2. 
Th~ Act guarantees individuals ' rigllt to p1·ivacy by giving individuals the power to access 
and conlrnl how thei r personal information is proct:<>sed, collected, Lisee! and Jisclo~ed .95 
Some or the key rights guMani;,'ed by the act inclUL~c96; 
· Access to personal information, 
11. Right to amend yf)nr personal info1mation, 
111. Right to prc·v'cnt processing of' y0u1. personal information, 
v. Right to prevent processing of personal data for djrect marketing purpose, 
v1. Right to seek compensation through the courts, and, 
VII. Right to complain to the Data Protection Commission. 
4.2 Kenya 
The Data Protection Bill is proposed legislation intent on givi ng effect to Artic le 31 of the 
Constitution of Kenya. 
93 Part 2 (Sections 17-27). Act 843. Daw Protection Act 2012 (Ghana). 
?J Section 2 1, Act 843, Data Protection Act 20 12 (Ghana). 
95 Section 18, Act 843, Datct Protection Act 2012 (G hana). 
96 Part 2, Act 843, Data Protectio11!1ct 2012 (Ghana). 
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The Biil as established is meant to be enforced .h:/ ·the·:Commission on Administrative 
Justice97 unlike the Ghanaian law which created a ·Data Protection Commiss;on. The Key 
principle behind it is that in the automatic pr0cessing ef data, the data should not be disclosed 
to any third parties without the pem1ission or consent of the person to whom the information 
is obtained.98 It has been drafted as a bili to regulate the collectio!l, processing, keeping, use 
and disclosure of certain intormation relating to individuals that is processed automatically.99 
Such data includes mobile money transfer infmmation as demonstrated earlier. 
The bill, as currently drafted, incorporates most of the fundamental features of a data 
protection law. These include; 100 
1. It allows for the collection or storage of data provided it is done so lawfully and 
~loes not intrude upon the privacy of data subj.ect to aP nnreasonab' -:! extent. With 
regards to mobile money transfers this !}1"0\'Ision is impo~iant in that it stops data 
holder or agents li·om unlawfully using data in their p6ssession. to mfringe on the 
privc:cy of individuals i.e. dam :;ubjects. 
. 
11. . lnfmmation must be collected directly ~rom and with the com;ent of the data 
subject. This provisio11 stops telecommunications, which hold mohile money 
customer datn, frmr, using the data in their possession without the conseilt .of the 
data subject. Mor ... l(; that, this provision requires that telecommunication~ or other 
third parties dealing with customer mobile money mctadata, to get data directly 
ii·orn the data subject where possible. 
Tht' bill ~J ... ·_!. !'!.:'L·t!ir~s th::t th:: rh~ta s~;bj e~ · h(~ in for ·-"~~) :' r tl!~ ~!· ·"' .;c;e f.· ... ,i v· ~'"' · .k 
. .·:.· 
data is to l.Jc coliected prior to collection. This is crucial especially smce 
tel ecommunications deal with big data concerning mobile money transfers which 
as outlined earlier have a high potential for abuse. 
iv. Lastly, the bill requires that appropriate tcclmical and organizational measures 
have to be taken to safeguard the data subject against the risk of loss, damage, 
destruction or or unauthorized access to personal infom1ation. This is very 
important especially for telecommunications dealing with customer data on 
mobile money transactions. Curre~tly, the National Payment Systems Regulations 
(NPS) of 2014 provide for consumer protection. Section 42 of the regulations 
97 Clause 20, Dma Protection Bill (2013). 
98 Clause 5, Data Protection Bill (2013). 
'
19 Clause 8, Daw Protection Bill (2013). 
100 Clause 3. Dllta Protection Bill (2013). 
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provide thai' disc)O!:ur• ~ :.1 C<..mfider,tiaJ CUStomer infonnation is prohibited exct:pl 
under the following circumstances; 
a. To the customer concerned, 
b. To the central Bank, 
c. When authorised in writing by t!l\:! customer concerned, or 
d. As required by law. 
These circumstances however fail to capture the overarching principle of consent 
which is very crucial in data protection. Before any dissemination of personal data 
the person(s) holding the data must seek the consent of the data subject. 
A look at M-PESA's terms and conditions (T&Cs) of service, which min·ors most 
mobile money platfonns T &Cs. will reveal .. that in deed there is a privacy 
policy. 101 The privacy puiicy recognises the importance of protecting the p1ivacy 
'· of ali · intormation provided by users or Ivi-PESA. in the pohcy, Safaricom, the 
telecommunication company offerin_g. the M-PI:;S A ~cxvice, admits to c~.~u~ct 
personally identitia~~~~ infonnation that it 11ses to profile !"1-PESA usei·s and 
administer individual M-PESA accounts. update M-PFSA databases, and provide 
user Sl!pport. 102 
The policy hCiwe-w guarantees that Safaricom doesn't share user personal 
infonnation with unauthorised person's and ~dequate safeguards have been put iq. 
place to prevent unauthorised access and to. ensure. conilocntie: lity of your personal 
The p1ivacy policy also provides that Safaricom shall have the right to monitor 
user account usage and may disclose personal infonnation to local law 
enforcement or investigative agencies or any competent regulatory or 
governmental agencies to assist in the prevention, detection or prosecution of 
money laundering activities, fraud or other criminal activities. 104 This leaves the 
personal information of a data subject vulnerable to governmental seizure in the 
name of 'prevention, detection or prosecution of money laundering activities, 
fraud or other criminal activities' . 
• 
101 Section 4.0, Safaricom M-PESA Customer Terms and Conditions. 2007. 
102 Section 4.2, Sq(aricom M-PESA Customer Terms and Conditions. 2007 
103 Section 4.3 , Safaricom M-PESA Customer Terms and Conditions. 2007 
IQ.I Section 4.6. Safaricom M-PESA Customer Terms and Conditions. 2007. 
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; ... The wording of the J'Oiicy uuder se::t ic· !~ ~-7 states ihat ·'Safaricom employees who-
handle personal information are i.mder an ob ligation to treat it ~'onfidentially and 
may not disclose it to unauthorized thi!·d parties." The use of the word ' may' again 
leaves the data subject in a precarious position as it leaves the personal 
information to the whims of Safaricom employees. 
Additionally, it would be neater and tidier for the bill to insett provisions on the fundamental 
Right to Data Protection in the following terms; 
1. Every person shall have the right to secrecy for the personal data concerning him 
especially with regard to his or her private and family life, in so far as he or she 
has an interest deserving such protection. Such data can include; medical 
payments, insurance payments, certain online purcha~e~ amor:·.s others. Such an 
interest is prec-luded when data cami01 be 'subject to .the- ri~bt to secrecy due to 
•heir gene·rai availabil ity or because they· cannot be traced back to rhe data subject.· 
11. In so fnr as personal datu i~. not used in the vital interest of the data ·;ubj <.·· • or with 
' . ' 
his <.:onseut, :·estrictions to the rig.h-: to secrecy are only permitted to safeg .. J•·ri 
ovc:···iding legitin •ate interests of anothet. But even. in the case (r per:nitted ·· · 
restrictio,,~, th~' interv .. ~ntion with the fundame_ntal right shnli he carried out u~inb 
only the least inhu ·i'. c (Jf all ~rfective methods. 
These two provisions will provide the much n~eded clarity as to what persons holding 
customer data t:Jn or cannot do with such data .. Thi~. is espec-inHy more appu.r~nt tc• . the 
transactions. 105 
Also, these two provis ions wi ll hopefull y ensure design and entoreement of data privacy and 
security rules contained in the T &Cs of the various mobile money platforms, which require 
some level of coordination between supervisory and regulat01y authorities, as mobile 
payments cuts across different sectors such as banking and telecommunications. If the current 
privacy provisions of the various T &Cs of mobile money platfon11S could be amended to 
include rul es as to right to secrecy as provided above, then much needed clarity would be 
available to the agents handling customer data as relates to mobile money transfers. 
105 Malala .J, 'Consumer Protection Jbr Mobile Payments in Kenya: An Examination of the Fragmented 
Legislation and the Complexities it Presents ror Mobile Payments' 35. 
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In summary regulators ar.d ,:;·0ilc money providers, in Kenya, need to w01 k together to . 
understand security concerns and maintain the integrity of customer data, just like i'n Ghana. 
In both countries, mobile money operators have developed various systems to protect 
customer privacy. Typically, they back up their IT systems (at least) daily, and the 
Unstructured Supplementary Services Data (USSD) and the SIM Application Tool Kit (STK) 
channels used to transact mobile money customer orders have so far proven to be sufficiently 
secure, over the years. USSD is also session-based, which leave~ no traces of the transaction 
once the session is closed. SMS (Short Messaging Service) is encrypted over secure links. 10(, 
Customers are also responsible for protecting their password, PIN number, and other 
sensitive info1mation. This however doesn't eliminate the need to have a Data Protection Act 
for Kenya as such a law will bring with it the much needed clarity on who is responsible if 
data associated with mobile money falls into the wrong-hands. 
106 Ma lala J, 'Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments in Kenya: An Examination of' the Fragmented 
Legislatio11 and the Complexities it Presents for Mobile Payments' 36. 
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. .. 
CHAPTFJ3 3- CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEND A T!ONS f ,)" ·.l 
The importance of digital technologies in driving the economy cannot be overemphasised. 
While perhaps one of the most dynamic and compelling, mobile money is just one of many 
teclmologies with the power to help transform African economies. Privacy and data 
protection concerns are distinct issues th<lt arise in any electronic platform especially payment 
systems. Due to the convergence of the industries, consumer protection policies are not 
specific to the needs of mobile payments. 107 However, with fmancial resources 
understandably limited, parliament should take policy and/or legislative actions that will 
increase user trust and privacy protections within the mobile money sector which is prevalent 
in Kenya and A fl:ica at large and more akin to African payment systems. 
Primary amongst the~e.st~rs is insti·: uting a comprehensive but flexible privacy regime and in 
pa11icular ''nac.ting a law 011 Data Protection . . In reviewing the Jnck of privac::y regulation in 
East Afi·ica, the United Nalions Conference on TTade and Development (UNCT AD).declares 
~lJCtt "simple and transparent mechani1>'1TIS arc needed througl! \Vhich users . can authorize an 
entity 10 ;1ccess'' data associated w ith mobile 111\.•ney. 108 l~dividuals shm;'d be empowered 
through national legislation to control their personal infl1rmation and corporations should b~~ 
required to use that informattun unly in contextually appropriate ways. Licensing for· mobile 
· nney ~ervices should include expliLil rules for i.h" collect ioP .;nd sharing of personal 
infonnation. 
Crucially, it is imperative-~hat parliament implemonts comprehensive regulations -rather th~n 
. . 
takmg a ~c:c·, orie:ll·approach, a~ ha.s llnfo,Jed. in ti'(7 Uaitt:J ~ •• ,Les: !<.; , Sec.to1 - ~·:'ecth(' !aws may 
prove inadequate for converged technologies Like mobile money transfer, leaving banks, 
telecommunications companies, and data brokers with differing requirements leading to 
inconsistent treatment of user data. 110 The NPS regulations are indeed welcomed but, there 
needs to be a more comprehensive legal document deal ing only with mobile money 
transactions so as to eradicate any room for doubt amongst the relevant p layers in the 
industry. 
107 Mala la J, 'Consumer Protection for Mobile Payments in Kenya: An Examination of the Fragmented 
Leg1slation and the Comp lexities it Presents for Mobile Payments' 37. 
108 UN Conference on Trade and Development, ' Mobile Money for Business Development in the East Afi·ican 
Community: A Comparative Study on Existing Platforms and Regulations,' 35. 
109 Harris A, FrankS, Goodman Y, Traynor P, 'Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for Digita l Wallet 
Deployment' 185. 
110 Harris A. FrankS, Goodman Y, Traynor P, 'Emerging Privacy and Security Concerns for Digita l Wallet 
Deployment ', 185. 
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Keltya should follow in the steps of Ghana whidi enac!ed. ;.:; 'Data Pro(ec..:l ion law in February 
2012. 111 This is a .~omprehensive law that establishes users' rights of data access, cofttrol, and 
consent ofuse. 112 The Ghanaian law, as high lighted, c reates a Data Protection Commission to 
enforce and regulate the provisions of the Ghana Data Protection Act, 20 12. 
While protecting citizens should be a primary concern for policymakers, they must also seck 
balance in any law, working to ensure that new legis lation is not overly prescriptive or 
burdensome for corporations b1inging innovative tools to the marketplace. For instance, 
while many international businesses welcome the European' s new privacy plans to streamline 
privacy rules in a more centralized manner, these same companies also protest the 
regulation 's more stringent guidelines such as the proposal for an individual 's " right to be 
forgotten." 113 While the proper balance between adequate protection and flexible business 
I • . . 
operations is certainly delicate, parliament must act in order tv ensure the ultimate success of 
Following lour yeurs of development, the European Union (EU) Gcne1'al Data Protectic•n 
Regulation (GDPR) wa:; adov·::d on 27 April 2016 and is set to come into tvrcc across the 
EU on 7.5 May 20 i 8. T:·v:.~ GDPR aim~ to conso lidate and strengthen data protection rights for 
individual~ within the EU. One stri1<ing feature that we could bon·ow from tiac GDPR is that 
consent has been made mar~ ()11.;1 ou:; for organis.1tions to satisfy and the rcqult .::nJcnts fur the 
content of privacy notices arc changed meamng all organisations will likely need to amend 
h · · · · · d 115 Tl . f b t eu· ex1~~;ng pnv<1cy not1ces an terms. 1c Importance o · cons;;nt C<i;tnot e 
crafted in our data protectic:1: !-:·1!i as well as the f&Cs of mobiie money. platfonm. 
Regulations adopted should be consistent and robust enough to hold providers responsible for 
data privacy, and they should be liable for privacy breaches and misuse of customer data. 
Regulation also needs to be technology neutral, since imposition of specific standards and 
protocols in a rapidl y evo lving industry is like ly to hinder innovation. 
I l l Daily Guide, Data Pr01ection Bill Passed. Ghana web (I 0 Feb 20 12), 
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=229717 on 23 December 201 7. 
11 ~ Data Protection Act 843 of 20 I 0 (Ghana) 
http://www.parliament.gh/assetslfile/Bi lls/Data%20Prolcction%20Act.%2020 I O.pdf on 3 January 2018 
113 Privacy Laws: Private Data, Pub I ic Rules, The Economist (28 January 20 12), 
http://www.economist.com/node/21543489 on 3 January 2018. 
11 ~ llarris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Afri ca' 258. 
1 
I> Article 32, General Data Protection Reg11lations. 2018 (European Union). 
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" ... 
To adclr·::js the lack of technical capacity, policy maker<; showld stres~, tb~~ :study ofsecunty, 
pnvacy, computer science and infonnation programs in universities. There is a growing 
demand for African app developers, and universities will train many of them. These 
universities should insist on strong privacy and security backgrounds. These courses of study 
should be promoted as holding patticular import for future development with inc:entives 
created to draw in prospective students. To help faciiitate a greater emphasis on privacy and 
security at the university level, policy makers should encourage empowering pa11nerships 
with international institutions that excel in the field. For instance, the Rwandan government 
recently sponsored a Carnegie Mellon Un iversity campus in Kigali with the government 
committing to offer substantial scholarships to qualifying applicants. Camegie Mellon's 
Rwanda campus offers Masters of Science in Information Technology with the option to 
focus on cyber-!)ecurity and b~:gan classes in the fall of 2012.116 This action is a dear 
indication that the Rwa;1dan govemment understands that technologic:-!! :.idvances must be 
•' -'- ' I ,'. •', 
accompanied with sufficient human capacity. Similar pa1tnerships coupled with lhe 
•. 
promotion of security and privacy studies can help Afiican nal'i CJns make strides in add1:essi~g 
h · · II i m;:<-:n cap:.1C!ty 1ssues. 
. . 
African appiication clevdopers and serv;:~c providers -=an of course begin to place a grea~er . . 
emphasis on personal privacy and security !) y designi;tg sn lut"ions to protect networks and 
. . 
data and providing users tools to proit.::ct tbemsefves and their devices. In considering the 
problems of transparency i•~ mobi le money applications in the African context, developers 
could explore some or the benefits ofe-casi1,' a primari ly conceptuRI di gital CL~li'ency in ~:1hic.h 
'. . . - . . ·. . . .__ .. ··- . .. - . . .. 
transac!im1s ·~re anonymous and funds can.n(;'~: be- dochi;; .-spii:nt. Bitcoin i:: t !'!e n:0.sr prominem · 
manifestation of e-cash, although numerous technical and regulatory problems exist with this 
pa11icular implementation.31 With proper research, mobile money applications may find some 
of the principles and features of e-cash useful in introducing layers of anonymity and 
protection for users. 
Parliament in conjunction with the relevant state agenc1es such as the Communications 
Authority of Kenya should conunission public awareness campaigns focused on cyber-
security and personal data. Public awareness campaigns can increase digital literacy, 
informing consumers of basic dos and don'ts to protect themselves and others. 
116 Carnegie Mellon University in Rwanda, http://www.cmu.edu/rwanda/ on I 0 January 20 I 8. 
117 Harris A, Goodman S and Traynor P, ' Privacy and Security Concerns Associated with Mobile Money 
Applications in Afl·ica' 258 . 
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f. inally, there is no doubt about the enormous pot~n!i<ti for mcb'ile money in K.::nya and 
Africa at large: . For a country that was plagued by limited banking options, mobil.~ money has 
in just a short time brought millions to the ranks of financial inclusion. The increased data 
collection, record keeping and transparency as required by FA TF, renders mobile money 
users in AfJ:ica particularly vulnerable to govemmental or corpo!'ate abuse of the data 
generated by mobile transactions. Equally troubling are cyber-security concerns, leaving 
mobile money users in a double precarious position. Should mobile money platf01ms come to 
be inundated with privacy breaches and malware, users will lose tmst in the application, 
reversing adoption trends and eliminating potential gains. It is therefore incumbent for all to 
act- govemmenl, human rights watchdogs, corporations, and individual c itizens-to address 
ex isting defici encies and ensure that the enormous power of mobile money will be enjoyed in 
Kenya and a,,,·oss Africa at large. 
.· . 
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